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Suppose a jury rejects a Black defendant’s testimony 
because they believe that Black people are often 
untrustworthy. Or suppose the male members of a 
board reject a female colleague’s suggestions because 
they believe that women are too often irrational. 
Imagine also a woman whose postpartum depression 
is dismissed by her doctor as mere ‘baby blues.’[1] 
All three people above suffer what contemporary 
English philosopher Miranda Fricker calls epistemic 
injustice.[2] “Epistemic” means relating to knowledge. 
Epistemic injustice refers to a wrong done to 
someone as a knower or transmitter of knowledge: 
due to unjustified prejudice, someone is unfairly 
judged to not have the knowledge or reasonable 
beliefs that they actually have. 
Fricker identifies two forms of epistemic 
injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical. This essay 
explains these forms of epistemic injustice and 
surveys some suggestions for how to prevent them. 
1. Testimonial Injustice 
Testimony involves someone sharing their 
knowledge with someone else. Testimony typically 
happens when people communicate: e.g., telling 
directions, reporting the news, writing a research 
paper. Testimony isn’t just statements in a 
courtroom: whenever we gain knowledge from other 
people, we rely on testimony. Testimony 
is credible when there’s good reason to believe that 
what’s claimed is true, when the person testifying 
knows what they claim to know.[3] 
A speaker suffers testimonial injustice when their 
testimony is judged to be not or less credible because 
of prejudice and not because the testimony itself is 
unreasonable.[4] These prejudices can be related to 
race, gender, accent, age, and others and impact 
people in many areas of life: economic, educational, 
professional, sexual, legal, political, religious, and 
more. Testimonial injustices caused by such 
prejudices constitute the central cases of testimonial 
injustice. 
Testimonial injustice can take various forms. For 
instance, a female board member’s prediction might 
be rejected due to the prejudices of her male 
colleagues: this is called testimonial quieting. 
Alternatively, that female board member might 
instead silence or limit her assertions beforehand 
knowing that she’ll receive inappropriately low 
credibility: this is called testimonial smothering.[5] 
2. Hermeneutical Injustice 
A second type of epistemic injustice is known 
as hermeneutical injustice. “Hermeneutical” relates 
to interpretation and understanding. 
Consider sexual harassment. Although this might be 
surprising, that concept hasn’t always existed. So 
imagine a woman who is sexually harassed at her 
workplace before the introduction of the concept in 
the 1970s.[6] She lives in a society where unwanted 
sexual propositions are typically seen as a form of 
‘flirting,’ and rejection of them as a ‘lack of a sense of 
humor.’ Since she lacks the concept of sexual 
harassment, she’ll have difficulty understanding her 
experience adequately or finding the appropriate 
words to communicate it to others. 
Hermeneutical injustice then is about cases of lacking 
the concepts to adequately understand or 
communicate an experience. Hermeneutical injustice 
occurs when this failure is due ultimately to 
prejudices that result in people lacking the concepts 
needed to understand or communicate their 
experiences.[7] The injustice above was due to 
women’s (partial) exclusion from certain 
professions—e.g., journalism, politics, academics, 
law—which tended to result in biased 
interpretations of women’s experiences, as in 
interpreting sexual harassment as merely a form of 
flirting. 
Some argue that hermeneutical injustice doesn’t 
require a lack of concepts since it can occur when 
interpretations of a certain group’s experiences and 
the resulting concepts are unduly dismissed by 
others. For instance, postpartum depression might be 




genuine medical condition: this is 
called hermeneutical dissent.[8] 
Unlike testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice 
is not the result of an individual hearer’s prejudice: 
no single agent perpetrates hermeneutical 
injustice.[9] In the sexual harassment example, it’s not 
any individual’s prejudice, but prejudicial practices in 
society that resulted in people lacking the concept of 
sexual harassment. 
3. The Wrong of Epistemic Injustice 
Many people closely associate producing and 
spreading knowledge with being human. Epistemic 
injustice results in victims’ being at least partially 
excluded from participation in these activities. 
Epistemic injustice can lead to grave practical 
consequences for both victims and wrongdoers. A 
wrongly disbelieved defendant might lose their 
freedom or life. Not listening to a board member who 
might have crucial knowledge for the future of the 
company may have dire consequences. 
Epistemic injustice also harms the victim’s identity. 
We typically define ourselves partly by our group 
identities: racial, sexual, religious, political, and more. 
We construct this part of our identity largely by 
communicating with others or using the available 
conceptual resources. So, being considered 
untrustworthy or lacking the conceptual resources to 
make sense of our experiences potentially prevents 
us from constructing our own social identity—from 
becoming who we are. If a woman who is interested 
in and has a talent for politics is constantly excluded 
from political dialogue, she can hardly fulfill her 
potential to become a politician.[10] 
4. How to Prevent Epistemic Injustice 
To prevent epistemic injustice, Fricker suggests that 
we cultivate reliable character traits—virtues—that 
neutralize prejudice.[11] 
We should aim to be aware of the potential prejudice 
in who we judge as credible. If we find that the low 
credibility we assigned to a speaker is due to 
prejudice, we should work to change that attitude.[12] 
Since victims of prejudice can have undue difficulty 
articulating their experiences, we should try to make 
out how their experiences would be understood in a 
prejudice-free climate. 
Some argue that individual efforts, though they 
should prove useful, may not be enough to defeat 
epistemic injustice. For instance, education is a 
marker of credibility. But the lack of proper 
education might be due to the absence of fair 
opportunities for education. So that some people are 
unfairly considered not credible and excluded from 
participation in knowledge-related activities is due to 
underlying injustice in social institutions. The 
solution then requires changes in social institutions, 
not just individual efforts.[13] 
5. Conclusion 
It’s difficult to overestimate the value of being 
(recognized as) someone with knowledge. So it’s 
difficult to overestimate the badness of knowledge-
related unfairness or epistemic injustice. Avoiding 
such injustice, however, might require both serious 
personal efforts and social and political change. 
Notes 
[1] See Medina and Pohlhaus (2017) for further 
discussion on, and examples of, varieties of epistemic 
injustice. 
[2] Fricker (2007, p. 7). 
[3] See Green, Epistemology of Testimony, for further 
discussion on the epistemology of testimony. 
[4] More specifically, a speaker suffers testimonial 
injustice when they are given a level of credibility 
different from what’s appropriate due to prejudice. 
Hence, a speaker might suffer testimonial injustice 
also as a result of their testimony being judged 
as more credible than it actually is. Fricker argues 
that individual cases of one’s testimony being judged 
more credible doesn’t constitute testimonial 
injustice. However, she accepts that these cases 
seldom might add up to testimonial injustice (Fricker 
2007, pp. 20-21). Davis (2016) argues that a 
speaker’s testimony being judged more credible is a 
bigger problem than Fricker thought. This is because, 
Davis argues, testimonial injustice is wrong primarily 
because the victim is treated merely as a member of a 
group and not as the unique person that she is. And 
when a speaker is judged as more credible due to 
(positive) prejudices that are based on (positive) 
stereotypes, she’s treated merely as a member of a 
group and not as the unique person that she is. 
[5] Doston (2011). Beyond statements and 
explanations, asking questions can also be treated 
unjustly. For instance, questions asked by women 





[6] See Fricker (2007, p. 149-152) for a history of how 
the concept of sexual harassment was introduced. 
[7] Fricker (2007, p. 158). 
[8] Goetze (2018). 
[9] Fricker (2007, p. 159). However, as Fricker notes, 
“[w]hile hermeneutical injustice is not perpetrated by 
individuals, it will normally make itself apparent in 
discursive exchanges between individuals” (Fricker, 
2007, p. 18). 
[10] Fricker (2007, p. 54). 
[11] Corresponding to the two forms of epistemic 
injustice, Fricker identifies two different character 
traits and calls them the virtue of testimonial justice, 
and the virtue of hermeneutical justice. A virtue, 
roughly, is a relatively stable character trait—like 
honesty, generosity, or compassion. 
[12] This is one way the aim of the virtue of testimonial 
justice could be achieved. Another way it could be 
achieved is by plain personal familiarity. Suppose a 
certain accent presents an obstacle to one’s fair 
credibility judgment. One could converse with people 
having that accent, or socialize with them, which can 
in time eradicate this obstacle. With plain 
habituation, people’s race, age, accent, etc. can stop 
being relevant to their credibility (Fricker 2007, p. 
96). Fricker also suggests that if “the whole business 
of judging credibility becomes too indeterminate, we 
may need to suspend judgment altogether” (Fricker 
2007, p. 92). 
[13] Anderson (2012). 
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